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TIME TO GO? (INTER)NATIONAL MOBILITY AND 
APPOINTMENT SUCCESS OF YOUNG ACADEMICS 
1 Introduction 
Based on a survey of business professors in German-speaking countries, Fiedler and 
Welpe (2008) find a researcher’s international experience to be of considerable im-
portance in appointment decisions – in addition to a candidate’s job fit and his or her 
publication record. But why should appointment committees appreciate a candidate’s in-
ternational experience? Why should international experience be judged to have a value in 
itself?  
With this article we try to shed light on this question by analyzing whether and how in-
ternational experience actually influences appointment decisions – over and above poten-
tially boosting an applicant’s publication record (see Franzoni, Scellato, and Stephan 
(2014) for the latter effect). While there is first tentative evidence by Schulze, Warning, 
and Wiermann (2008) that a researcher’s international experience may in fact reduce the 
time it takes him or her to get tenure, there is no study that comprehensively analyzes the 
relation between an upcoming researcher’s international mobility and his or her appoint-
ment success. We go beyond the existing literature and (a) distinguish between different 
durations of a researcher’s stay abroad, and (b) do not only look at the time it takes an 
upcoming researcher to get tenure but also at whether (s)he succeeds in being appointed 
to a highly reputable institution or not. The latter is an attempt to add a quality dimension 
to the outcome variable “appointment success”. Further, we (c) analyze different “ap-
pointment regimes” and separately study the situation before and after the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Framework Act on Higher Education (Fünfte Novelle des Hochschulrah-
mengesetzes). Last not least, we (d) explicitly compare the effects of international mobil-
ity with those of national mobility, i.e. with the effects of a researcher’s change of affili-
ation within one country – in an attempt to find out more about the underlying mecha-
nisms that make appointment committees appreciate international mobility in comparison 
to national mobility. In so doing, we are the first to analyze a potential direct link between 
a researcher’s national mobility and his or her appointment success – over and above the 
effect national mobility might have on a researcher’s publication record (for the latter see 
e.g., Bäker (2015); Bolli and Schläpfer (2015); Fernández-Zubieta, Geuna, and Lawson 
(2015)).  
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With our study, which is largely explorative in nature, we seek to address the following 
research questions: 
1. Do appointment committees value international experience in itself? I.e., does in-
ternational experience positively impact career success when controlling for a po-
tentially boosted publication record? And if so, does the value of international ex-
perience depend on the length of the stay abroad?  
2. Are there any differences in the effects of international mobility and national mo-
bility? If yes, what does this teach us about the motives behind appointment com-
mittees valuing international experience? 
3. Is there any indication that the value associated with (inter)national mobility 
changes during time? Can we distinguish different “regimes” for the appointment 
of professors? 
To address these questions, we analyze a data set of 330 researchers in business and eco-
nomics in Germany, Austria and German-speaking Switzerland. We focus on upcoming 
researchers and study whether and how (inter)national mobility before the first appoint-
ment to the position of a full professor affects their career success. With respect to the 
measurement of career success, we regard both, the probability that an upcoming re-
searcher gets tenure within the next given time span and the probability that (s)he is ap-
pointed to a highly reputable institution.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we present our conceptual 
framework and elaborate on why appointment committees might value upcoming re-
searchers with (inter)national academic experience. Section 3 describes the data, 
measures and empirical strategy, and section 4 presents our results. Section 5 contains a 
discussion and points to potential implications. 
2 Conceptual Background: Why Appointment Committees Might Value (In-
ter)National Experience 
2.1 Investment in Human and Social Capital 
A first theoretical explanation of why appointment committees might care about an ap-
plicant’s international experience is that international experience is seen as an investment 
in the researcher’s human and social capital broadening the applicant’s knowledge base 
and generating new contacts that might prove useful in the future. In the business context, 
there is empirical evidence that both skill and network development represent important 
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motives for employees to go abroad (see Lähteenmäki and Paalumäki (1993); Stahl and 
Cerdin (2004); Dickmann and Harris (2005); Dickmann, Doherty, Milly, and Brewster 
(2008)). Also in the context of academia, researchers go abroad because they expect to 
increase their knowledge base via access to new literature, methods, trainings and courses 
that help to develop their professional and personal skills and to increase and strengthen 
their networks (Kyvik, Karseth, Remme, and Blume (1999); Fries-Britt (2000); Richard-
son and McKenna (2003); Melin (2004); Pellens (2012)).  
While part of this investment in a researcher’s human and social capital might already be 
reflected in his or her publication record when (s)he enters the job market, part of it might 
only payoff at a later point in time (in terms of future publications or enhanced chances 
to be granted third-party money). E.g., Fiedler, Welpe, and Picot (2008) show that up-
coming researchers often do not have that many publications when they enter the job 
market and often the variance in publication output between the job market candidates is 
not that high. Hence, appointment committees might rely on additional indicators and 
acknowledge a researcher’s international experience in the appointment process in addi-
tion to his or her current publication record – hoping to be able to participate in future 
returns from the past investment in human and social capital (e.g., when jointly applying 
for third-party funding or when being ranked for their research strength as a faculty). If 
international mobility is seen as an investment, longer stays abroad should rather increase 
a researcher’s appointment success than shorter stays since arguably the increase in hu-
man and social capital should be larger if the researcher spent more time abroad. 
When it comes to national mobility, i.e. a researcher’s past experience at different national 
institutions, this might also be seen as an investment in a researcher’s human and social 
capital. Having worked at different institutions and with different academic advisors 
could in principle increase the probability that the upcoming researcher has been exposed 
to different “schools” of knowledge and different research styles. Further, a researcher’s 
network will typically increase when changing affiliations – be it outside the country or 
within.  
 
2.2 Signaling 
A second reason why an appointment committee might care about a researcher’s mobility 
is that it can be seen as a signal for his or her future productivity, which is one of the 
major concerns of appointment committees. In this context, international experience, i.e. 
a researcher’s decision to go abroad, can be interpreted as a positive “signal” (Spence 
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(1973), see Connelly, Certo, Ireand, and Rentzel (2011) for an overview of signaling the-
ory applied in management studies) for otherwise unobservable, but still desirable traits, 
e.g., a researcher’s flexibility, open-mindedness, or career-orientation – traits that can be 
expected to positively affect a researcher’s visibility in the future and might hence benefit 
the appointing institution. An appointment committee might then rightfully value a re-
searcher’s international mobility in the appointment process. Accordingly, one would 
again expect a researcher’s international mobility to positively affect his or her appoint-
ment success. 
However, national academic mobility is different. Unlike international mobility, national 
mobility could also be seen as signaling disloyalty or fickleness in general, with both 
characteristics being viewed unfavorably by appointment committees. Furthermore, a 
change of affiliation within the country could – more than a temporary stay abroad – also 
signal involuntary mobility, i.e. resulting from the doctoral granting institution not having 
offered a new contract. This is particularly true in the institutional regime before the Fifth 
Amendment to the Framework Act on Higher Education, when Juniorprofessorships did 
not exist and young researchers typically stayed with their doctoral degree granting insti-
tution until they finished their Habilitation, and then moved on to a full professorship at 
another university. However, this might have changed in the course of the introduction of 
the Juniorprofessorship in 2002 rendering pre-tenure changes in national affiliation more 
common. As a result, there might well be a “regime change” when it comes to appoint-
ment committees’ assessment of the signaling value of national academic mobility. We 
propose that a “regime change” might have occurred in the context of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Framework Act on Higher Education which took effect in 2002 (see e.g., 
Chlosta and Pull (2010) on a theoretical analysis of the associated career effects). Among 
others, the Fifth Amendment to the Framework Act on Higher Education introduced the 
Juniorprofessorship targeting upcoming researchers who recently obtained their doctor-
ate (i.e. around 2000 or later). Juniorprofessors have to change affiliation at least once 
before getting tenured and if they are on a tenure track they need to change before they 
become a Juniorprofessor. Further, since positions for Juniorprofessors are not as prev-
alent as traditional positions for university assistants after their doctorate, even those Jun-
iorprofessors that are not on a tenure track often change their affiliation before becoming 
a Juniorprofessor (see Fiedler, Welpe, and Picot (2006)). This will, as we argue, lead to 
pre-tenure national mobility becoming more common and thus more acceptable. Alto-
gether, for the younger cohorts we expect national mobility to be no longer a negative 
signal and ultimately even become a positive one.  
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2.3 Theoretical Predictions 
Concluding, we derive the following theoretical predictions: 
1. Given that it increases a researcher’s human and social capital and is further likely 
to be seen as a positive signal, international academic mobility positively affects 
a researcher’s appointment success. 
2. National academic mobility might positively affect a researcher’s human and so-
cial capital, but it might also be seen as a negative signal. Hence, from a theory 
perspective, it is unclear, whether and how national academic mobility will affect 
a researcher’s appointment success. 
3. For the younger cohorts, national academic mobility might no longer be associ-
ated with a negative signal and might ultimately even be associated with a positive 
signal.  
3 Data, Measures, and Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of 330 researchers in business and economics 
from Austria, Germany, and the German-speaking part of Switzerland who participated 
in an online survey in 2010. The survey was sent out to the members of an online portal 
by the German Economic Association, the Portal Forschungsmonitoring, that contains 
quality-approved data on researchers’ journal publication output, the year and the institu-
tion where the researcher obtained his or her doctorate and the year and institution where 
(s)he received tenure plus demographic information, such as gender and year of birth. In 
our additional survey, we collected information on stays abroad and a set of controls. For 
the respondents, we further hand-collected data on national changes of affiliation from 
researchers’ CVs.  
3.2 Measures 
The following two measures are used to proxy our dependent variable “appointment suc-
cess”: (a) the time span between obtaining one’s doctorate and getting tenure (time to 
tenure) and (b) whether the tenure-granting institution is among the highest-ranked insti-
tutions in Austria, Germany, or German-speaking Switzerland (reputation). Unfortu-
nately we do not have reputation rankings for all years when a researcher in our data set 
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was appointed to a tenured position for the first time. What we have and use, are quite 
recent faculty rankings issued by the Handelsblatt (business faculty ranking 2009, eco-
nomics faculty ranking 2011). Whereas the specific rank of a faculty will typically vary 
from year to year, whether a faculty is among the “top 10” should be comparatively more 
stable (even though not time invariant) over time. Therefore, we did not use the exact 
rank of an institution in the 2009 or 2011 ranking, but – as a rough proxy – instead created 
a dummy variable taking the value “1” if the institution belonged to the top 10 institutions 
within Austria, Germany, or German-speaking Switzerland according to the respective 
Handelsblatt ranking, and “0” otherwise (for a discussion of rankings, including the Han-
delsblatt ranking, see Albers (2011); Backes-Gellner (2011); Frey and Rost (2010); 
Reinartz (2011); Rost and Frey (2011)).  
Our main explanatory variables are national and international academic mobility. The 
dummy variable national mobility is coded as “1” if a researcher changed affiliation on a 
national scale while being a Post Doc, and “0” otherwise. Analogously, the dummy vari-
able international mobility is coded as “1” if a researcher stayed abroad for research pur-
poses before getting tenure and “0” otherwise. To analyze whether the duration of the 
stay abroad is of relevance, we chose four different operationalizations of our dummy 
variable international mobility, defining stays abroad as lasting at least one month, four 
months, six months, or one year. 
To concentrate on the direct effect of (inter)national mobility on appointment success, 
we control for publication productivity measured by a researcher’s journal publications 
per year since the researcher published his/her first article (adjusting for co-authors and 
applying quality weights according to the Handelsblatt journal ranking, see Krapf (2011) 
for details). Since some articles might have been accepted by a journal but not yet pub-
lished at the time of application for a full professorship, we include all journal publica-
tions up to and including the year after obtaining tenure. Acknowledging the literature on 
gender differences (e.g., Kahn (1992); Bailyn (2003)), we further control for gender 
(male). Furthermore, and analogous to Joecks, Pull, and Backes-Gellner (2014), we in-
clude a dummy variable for whether a researcher has children or not. Additionally, we 
control for the field of research (e.g., Heining, Jerger, and Lingens (2007); Schulze et al. 
(2008)) and distinguish between business and economics. The variable year of birth is 
meant to control for cohort effects, e.g., with respect to different job market situations. 
To control for the fact that a researcher’s scientific environment affects his or her produc-
tivity (see e.g., Fiedler, Welpe, Lindlbauer, and Sattler (2008)) we include the dummy 
variable reputation doctorate (see Bedeian, Cavazos, Hunt, and Jauch (2010)). It is coded 
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as “1” if the doctorate granting institution is among the top 10 institutions within Austria, 
Germany, or the German-speaking part of Switzerland according to the Handelsblatt 
ranking, and “0” otherwise. Lastly, we control for whether the researchers had taken part 
in a formal1 or informal mentoring relationship before obtaining tenure (see Long and 
McGinnis (1985); Muschallik and Pull (2015)). 
3.3 Empirical Strategy 
To test for the effect of national and international academic mobility on appointment suc-
cess, we need to apply different empirical methods. For our first dependent variable, the 
time it takes a researcher to get tenure (time to tenure), survival analysis or proportional 
hazard models are appropriate. Here we run Cox proportional hazard models (Cox (1972), 
see also Schulze et al. (2008) for the same approach). Cox proportional hazard models 
estimate the likelihood (hazard rate) of getting tenure in the next marginal time period, 
given that the researcher has not received tenure (“survived”) so far. In order to calculate 
this conditional probability of receiving tenure in the next marginal time period, the esti-
mation method needs observations of both tenured and (so far) untenured researchers. 
Similar to multivariate regression models, effects of covariates can be analyzed (see e.g., 
Lane, Looney, and Wansley (1986) or Lunn and McNeill (1995)). For our second de-
pendent variable (reputation), which refers to whether a researcher who already got ten-
ure was appointed at a faculty belonging to the “top 10 faculties” (dummy variable ‘1’) 
or not (dummy variable ‘0’), Logit regressions are appropriate. By definition, the Logit 
regressions only include researchers that already got tenure. 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the means of all variables used in our regressions. The Cox proportional 
hazard models analyzing the determinants of the time it takes a researcher to get tenure 
are based on the full sample, i.e., the tenured and the not yet tenured (see table 1, column 
1). Per definition, the Logit regressions analyzing the determinants of whether the tenure-
granting institution is highly ranked or not can only rely on the data of those that already 
                                                          
1 Formal mentoring refers to researchers that took part or still take part in a formal mentoring program set 
up e.g. by a university. Informal mentoring refers to researchers which are not involved in a formal men-
toring program, but rather state that they have an informal mentoring relationship such that mentor (which 
is not their academic advisor) and researcher have not been formally assigned to each other, but instead the 
mentoring relationship emerged “informally” and evolved gradually over time. 
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got tenure (see table 1, column 2). The bivariate correlations of the variables can be found 
in tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. 
Table 1 about here 
4 Results 
Table 2 presents the results of the Cox regression analysis testing whether there is an 
effect of (inter)national mobility on time to tenure when controlling for a researcher’s 
publication productivity. Interestingly and contrary to our first prediction, for interna-
tional mobility there is no statistically significant effect on time to tenure. That is, when 
controlling for publication productivity, researchers who went abroad do not get ap-
pointed faster to a tenured position – irrespective of whether they went abroad for one 
month or for a year. To the contrary, we find national mobility to be statistically signifi-
cantly and negatively related to the likelihood of the researcher to get tenure, giving some 
support to our second theoretical prediction. Depending on the model specification, a na-
tional change of affiliation decreases the likelihood of getting tenure by 13–14%.2 
Table 2 about here 
Table 3 presents the results of the Logit regression analysis with respect to our depend-
ent variable reputation. Provided that a stay abroad lasts at least four months, international 
mobility positively and significantly increases the likelihood of being granted tenure at a 
top 10 institution, supporting our first theoretical prediction. The effect size is considera-
ble with research stays of at least four months increasing the likelihood of receiving tenure 
at a highly ranked institution by about eight percentage points, and longer stays further 
increasing the likelihood of being appointed to a top 10 institution. To the contrary and 
referring to our second prediction, for national mobility we find a statistically significant 
negative effect on reputation in all four model specifications. Specifically, a national 
change of affiliation before getting tenure is associated with a decrease of about nine 
percentage points in the likelihood of getting tenure at an institution that is ranked among 
the top 10 in model (1) and about seven to eight percentage points in models (2) to (4).3  
                                                          
2 Controlling for the time a researcher has spent working as a practitioner (in months) between having 
obtained the doctorate and having received tenure as robustness check does not change our results on the 
relation between (inter)national mobility and time to tenure. The same is true for using the duration of 
international mobility in months instead of dummy variables. All results of the different robustness checks 
are available from the authors upon request. 
3 When using the duration of international mobility in months instead of dummy variables, the negative 
effect of national mobility on the likelihood of getting tenure at a highly ranked institution disappears. All 
other results remain unchanged.  
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Table 3 about here 
To analyze whether the value associated with (inter)national mobility has changed over 
time (prediction 3), we distinguish between different “appointment regimes” and sepa-
rately analyze the data for researchers who obtained their doctorate before 2000 and for 
those who obtained their doctorate in 2000 or later, arguing that the latter where already 
affected by the potential “regime change” in 2002.4  
Table 4 presents the results of the Cox regression analyses for researchers who ob-
tained their doctorate before 2000 (Panel A) and for researchers who obtained their doc-
torate in 2000 or later (Panel B). We find that national academic mobility for researchers 
who obtained their doctorate before 2000 is associated with a significant and negative 
effect on the likelihood of receiving tenure. That is, researchers who obtained their doc-
torate before 2000 and changed affiliation within the country before obtaining tenure 
needed more time to be appointed to a tenured position. Post-millennial, that is for re-
searchers who obtained their doctorate after 2000, we find no significant effects in all of 
our four specifications, supporting our third theoretical prediction. That is, our results for 
the whole sample (table 2) are driven by researchers who obtained their doctorate before 
2000. For international mobility, similar to our results for the whole sample in table 2, 
we find no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of receiving tenure (neither for 
Panel A nor for Panel B).5 
Table 4 about here 
Table 5 presents the results of the Logit regression analyses for researchers who ob-
tained their doctorate before 2000 (Panel A) and for researchers who obtained their doc-
torate in 2000 or later (Panel B). Concerning national academic mobility we find the 
following: For researchers in the “old regime”, changing affiliation is associated with a 
negative and significant effect on the likelihood of being granted tenure at a highly ranked 
institution. For researchers obtaining their doctorate in the year 2000 or later we find only 
in models (3) and (4) a significant impact of national academic mobility. Interestingly, 
this significant effect is a positive one, which — again — is in line with our prediction 3. 
For international mobility in Panel A, we find no significant effect on the likelihood of 
                                                          
4 As a further robustness check, we alternatively chose “2001” and “2002” as potential cut-off points for 
the presumed regime change. While many of our results remain robust to this variation in the cut-off year, 
having obtained a PhD either before 2000 or in 2000 or later seems to mark the most pronounced regime 
change. 
5 Controlling for the time a researcher has spent working as a practitioner (in months) between having 
obtained the doctorate and having received tenure does not change these results. Further, the results are 
robust when using the duration of international mobility in months instead of the different dummy variables.  
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receiving tenure at a highly ranked institution. However, for researchers obtaining their 
doctorate in the year 2000 or later (Panel B) (similar to our findings in table 3) for a stay 
abroad that lasts at least four months, international mobility positively and significantly 
increases the likelihood of being granted tenure at a top 10 institution. That is, while the 
positive effects of international mobility in the whole sample were apparently driven by 
the researchers who obtained their doctorate in 2000 or later, the negative effects of na-
tional mobility were clearly driven by the researchers who obtained their doctorate before 
2000 – with researchers who obtained their doctorate in 2000 or later even showing a 
slight indication of national mobility starting to be even positively valued by appointment 
committees of highly ranked institutions. 6 
Table 5 about here 
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Motivated by the finding that appointment committees care for international experience 
(Fielder and Welpe (2008)) and that international experience can reduce the time to get 
appointed to a full professorship (Schulze et al. (2008)), we set out to dig deeper into the 
effects of pre-tenure (inter)national academic mobility on upcoming researchers’ career 
success. 
Surprisingly, unlike Schulze et al. (2008), we do not find an effect of international 
mobility on time to tenure. However, we do find a significant and positive effect of inter-
national mobility on the “quality dimension” of career success: stays abroad of at least 
four months duration increase the likelihood of being granted tenure at a top 10 institution 
by at least eight percentage points. This positive effect of international mobility on career 
success, though found only for highly reputed faculties, is in line with our first theoretical 
prediction based on human and social capital theory on the one hand and signaling theory 
on the other. Consequently, the positive effect might be due to human and social capital 
gains caused by a stay abroad and/or international mobility being perceived as a positive 
signal.  
Comparing the effects of international mobility and national mobility sheds further 
light on the reasons why appointment committees might value international experience 
                                                          
6 The results on national mobility are robust when using the duration of international mobility in months 
instead of the different dummy variables. For international mobility we still find the positive effect, how-
ever this is now significant for researchers who obtained their doctorate before 2000 and not after. 
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more than they value national mobility. We find that in contrast to international mobility, 
pre-tenure national mobility (i.e. changes of affiliation within the country) is negatively 
related to both measures of career success (time to tenure and reputation of tenure grant-
ing institution). Specifically, researchers who changed their affiliation within the country 
before getting tenure need more time to be granted tenure and are less likely to be offered 
their first tenured position at a top 10 institution. This suggests that national mobility is 
indeed interpreted as a negative signal by appointment committees, over-compensating a 
potentially positive effect on human and social capital.  
Given the trend towards more mobility and the fact that the institutional framework 
for careers in academia within Germany has recently been reformed, preferences of ap-
pointment committees might be changing over time (as the results of Fiedler and Welpe 
(2008) suggest). Supporting this line of thought, we find that the positive effect of inter-
national experience on the likelihood of being appointed to a top 10 institution stems from 
observations under the ‘new regime’, i.e. the institutional framework associated with the 
Fifth Amendment to the Framework Act on Higher Education and the introduction of 
Juniorprofessorships. Under the ‘old regime’, stays abroad were apparently not valued 
positively in general. This is first evidence that the value of international experience is 
indeed increasing over time. Specifically, going abroad for research purposes has only 
recently become a means of increasing the likelihood of being appointed to a tenured 
position at a highly ranked institution. 
Focusing on national mobility, the results for the two different appointment regimes 
show further evidence of the existence of a regime change. While under the old regime 
national mobility increased the time it took to get tenure, for researchers under the new 
regime, no such negative effect can be observed. Even more striking are the results for 
our dependent variable ‘reputation of tenure granting institution’: For researchers under 
the old regime, national mobility had a negative effect on the likelihood of being ap-
pointed to a highly ranked institution. For researchers under the new regime, we even find 
a positive effect in some model specifications. This shows that with the change of the 
institutional framework, specifically the introduction of Juniorprofessorships, the prefer-
ences and perceptions of appointment committees seem to have changed as well, and 
national mobility is apparently no longer perceived as a negative signal. With the intro-
duction of Juniorprofessorships, pre-tenure national academic mobility thus has the 
chance to become the norm in the German-speaking system and lose a negative “stigma” 
that it seems to have had under the old regime.  
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Table 1: Mean Values of all Variables 
 Full sample 
(Cox regressions) 
Tenured 
(Logit regressions) 
Time to tenure (years) 6.897 7.34 
Reputation (n=219) 0.270 0.146 
   
International mobility (≥1 month, 1=yes) 0.521 0.484 
International mobility (≥4 months, 1=yes) 0.412 0.342 
International mobility (≥6 months, 1=yes) 0.336 0.292 
International mobility (≥1  year, 1=yes) 0.230 0.228 
National mobility 0.639 0.616 
   
Publication productivity (publication points 
per year) 
0.115 0.110 
Male (1=yes) 0.833 0.900 
Children (1=yes) 0.524 0.580 
Business (1=yes) 0.588 0.635 
Year of birth 1967 1965 
Reputation doctorate (1=top 10 rank) 0.270 0.251 
Mentoring (1=yes) 0.264 0.219 
   
n 330 219 
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Table 2: Determinants of the Probability to Get Tenure in the Next Marginal Time Pe-
riod According to Cox Regression: Estimated Hazard Ratios 
 Time to Tenure 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
International mobility (≥1 month, 1=yes) 0.871    
 (-0.99)    
International mobility (≥4 months, 1=yes)  1.047   
  (0.33)   
International mobility (≥6 months, 1=yes)   1.016  
   (0.11)  
International mobility (≥1  year, 1=yes)    1.161 
    (0.96) 
National mobility 0.865* 0.865* 0.863* 0.869* 
 (-1.92) (-1.92) (-1.93) (-1.85) 
     
Publication productivity (publication points per year) 5.428** 5.534** 5.508** 5.404** 
 (-2.90) (0.33) (2.92) (2.90) 
Male (1=yes) 1.559** 1.541** 1.542** 1.494* 
 (2.02) (1.97) (1.96) (1.8) 
Children (1=yes) 0.822 0.821 0.821 0.087 
 (-1.46) (-1.47) (-1.47) (-1.58) 
Business (1=yes) 1.852*** 1.940*** 1.930*** 1.969*** 
 (4.13) (4.53) (4.48) (4.62) 
Year of birth 1.047*** 1.045*** 1.045*** 1.045*** 
 (4.90) (4.70) (4.78) (4.75) 
Reputation doctorate (1=top 10 rank) 0.893 0.894 0.895 0.902 
 (-0.75) (-0.74) (-0.73) (-0.69) 
Mentoring (1=yes) 1.117 1.087 1.090 1.077 
 (0.7) (-0.74) (0.55) (0.47) 
     
BIC  2215.204 2216.065 2216.163 2215.278 
n 330 330 330 330 
Notes: Estimated hazard ratios displayed; z-values in parentheses; after testing for the proportionality assump-
tion changes of affiliation is included as time-varying covariate; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion;  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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Table 3: Determinants of Reputation According to Logit Regression: Estimated 
Margins 
 Reputation 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
International mobility (≥1 month, 1=yes) 0.016    
 (0.047)    
International mobility (≥4 months, 1=yes)  0.083*   
  (0.044)   
International mobility (≥6 months, 1=yes)   0.108**  
   (0.043)  
International mobility (≥1 year, 1=yes)    0.093** 
    (0.045) 
National mobility -0.089* -0.078* -0.073* -0.074* 
 (0.046) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) 
     
Publication productivity (publication points per 
year) 0.269 0.240 0.250 0.223 
 (0.205) (0.210) (0.207) (0.208) 
Male (1=yes) 0.039 0.038 0.028 0.029 
 (0.094) (0.095) (0.092) (0.093) 
Children (1=yes) 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.011 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) 
Business (1=yes) -0.065 -0.060 -0.061 -0.060 
 (0.048) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) 
Year of birth 0.008** 0.007** 0.008** 0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Reputation doctorate (1=top 10 rank) 0.077 0.076 0.080 0.080 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Mentoring (1=yes) -0.031 -0.034 -0.034 -0.032 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.058) (0.059) 
     
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.099 0.111 0.101 
n 219 219 219 219 
Notes: Marginal effects are displayed; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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Table 4: “Regime Change”: Researchers Who Obtained Their Doctorate Before and After 2000: 
Effects on the Probability to Get Tenure in the Next Marginal Time Period 
 Time to Tenure Time to Tenure 
 
Panel A: Researchers who obtained their doc-
torate before 2000 
Panel B: Researchers who obtained their doc-
torate in 2000 or later 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
International mo-
bility  
(≥1 month, 
1=yes) 
0.809    0.816    
(-1.22)    (-0.87)    
International mo-
bility  
(≥4 months, 
1=yes) 
 0.916    1.221   
 (-0.52)    (0.88)   
International mo-
bility  
(≥6 months, 
1=yes) 
  0.919    1.065  
  (-0.49)    (0.27)  
International mo-
bility  
 (≥1  year, 1=yes) 
   1.018    1.410 
   (0.09)    (1.28) 
National mobility 0.601** 0.596** 0.595** 0.603** 1.186 1.183 1.159 1.168 
 (-2.85) (-2.88) (-2.90) (-2.81) (0.67) (0.68) (0.59) (0.63) 
Publication 
productivity 
(publication 
points per year) 
2.767 2.778 2.770 2.798 14.399** 15.386** 14.089** 14.770** 
(1.09) (1.10) (1.10) (1.11) (2.68) (2.71) (2.62) (2.67) 
Male (1=yes) 1.360 1.358 1.362 1.356 2.018** 2.003** 1.981** 1.837* 
 (1.07) (1.06) (1.08) (1.07) (2.13) (2.04) (2.03) (1.79) 
Children (1=yes) 0.874 0.870 0.871 0.861 0.970 0.979 0.968 0.922 
 (-0.81) (-0.85) (-0.84) (-0.91) (-0.13) (-0.09) (-0.13) (-0.33) 
Business (1=yes) 1.801*** 1.906*** 1.901*** 1.947*** 1.927** 2.023** 1.986** 2.032** 
 (3.53) (4.05) (4.01) (4.19) (2.94) (2.94) (2.86) (2.89) 
Year of birth 1.041*** 1.040*** 1.040** 1.039** 1.197*** 1.181*** 1.187*** 1.180*** 
 (3.53) (3.49) (3.48) (3.39) (3.83) (3.53) (3.69) (3.52) 
Reputation doc-
torate  
(1=top 10 rank) 
0.946 0.953 0.953 0.946 0.735 0.767 0.757 0.802 
(-0.31) (-0.27) (-0.27) (-0.31) (-1.20) (-1.05) (-1.09) (-0.88) 
Mentoring 
(1=yes) 
1.232 1.209 1.215 1.201 1.107 1.016 1.047 0.993 
 (1.09) (1.00) (1.02) (0.97) (0.39) (0.06) (0.18) (-0.03) 
BIC 1305.617 1306.767 1306.803 1307.012 670.141 670.088 670.760 669.282 
n 163 163 163 163 167 167 167 167 
Notes: Estimated hazard ratios displayed; z-values in parentheses; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion; ***p<0.01, 
**p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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Table 5: “Regime Change”: Researchers Who Obtained Their Doctorate Before and After 2000: 
Effects on Reputation of the Tenure-Granting Institution 
 
Reputation  
(Panel A: Researchers who obtained their 
doctorate before 2000) 
Reputation  
(Panel B: Researchers who obtained their 
doctorate in 2000 or later) 
 
Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
International mobil-
ity  
(≥1 month, 1=yes) 
0.052    0.066    
(0.055)    (0.087)    
International mobil-
ity 
(≥4 months, 1=yes) 
 0.076    0.156**   
 (0.051)    (0.070)   
International mobil-
ity  
(≥6 months, 1=yes) 
  0.077    0.214***  
  (0.051)    (0.060)  
International mobil-
ity  
(≥1  year, 1=yes) 
   0.051    0.210*** 
   (0.050)    (0.065) 
National mobility 
-
0.182*** 
-
0.171*** 
-
0.168*** 
-
0.173*** 
0.129 0.144 0.167* 0.172* 
 (0.055) (0.051) (0.050) (0.053) (0.102) (0.099) (0.100) (0.097) 
Publication produc-
tivity  
(publication points 
per year) 
0.248 0.245 0.236 0.222 0.487 0.433 0.486 0.368 
(0.233) (0.234) (0.234) (0.235) (0.336) (0.329) (0.305) (0.325) 
Male (1=yes) 0.078 0.079 0.083 0.075 0.012 -0.012 -0.053 -0.027 
 (0.122) (0.121) (0.119) (0.123) (0.123) (0.115) (0.120) (0.121) 
Children (1=yes) -0.016 -0.017 -0.019 -0.013 0.165 0.159* 0.157 0.144 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.104) (0.097) (0.098) (0.099) 
Business (1=yes) -0.045 -0.042 -0.044 -0.049 -0.085 -0.101 -0.122 -0.123 
 (0.056) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.100) (0.096) (0.087) (0.099) 
Year of birth 0.009** 0.008* 0.008* 0.009* 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.046** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Reputation docto-
rate  
(1=top 10 rank) 
0.099 0.095 0.093 0.097 0.169 0.179 0.205 0.195 
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.121) (0.123) (0.127) (0.127) 
Mentoring (1=yes) 0.020 0.019 0.013 0.020 -0.108 -0.109 -0.099 -0.083 
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.106) (0.105) (0.098) (0.106) 
Pseudo R2 0.154 0.163 0.163 0.152 0.193 0.240 0.287 0.269 
n 143 143 143 143 76 76 76 76 
Notes: Marginal effects are displayed; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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Appendix 1.  
 
 
  
Table A1: Correlation Matrix: Time to Tenure-Sample 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Time to tenure (years)             
2. 
International mobility              
(≥1 month, 1=yes) 
 0.02 
            
3. 
International mobility          
(≥4 months, 1=yes) 
 0.01  0.67* 
          
4. 
International mobility          
(≥6 months, 1=yes) 
 0.05  0.58*  0.85*  
        
5. 
International mobility           
(≥1  year, 1=yes) 
 0.03  0.42*  0.65*  0.77* 
        
6. National mobility  0.11*  0.08 -0.01  -0.01 -0.05        
7. 
Publication productivity 
(publication points per year) 
-0.21*  0.07  0.05  0.07  0.08 -0.04       
8. Male (1=yes)  0.11*  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.17*  0.04  0.07      
9. Children (1=yes)  0.19* -0.07 -0.04  0.01  0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.00     
10. Business (1=yes) -0.23* -0.20* -0.07 -0.08 -0.10* -0.12* -0.07 -0.03 -0.02    
11. Year of birth -0.57*  0.17*  0.11*  0.04 -0.03  0.09*  0.10* -0.21* -0.25*  0.07   
12. Reputation doctorate  0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07  0.00  0.02  0.05 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01  
13. Mentoring (1=yes) -0.11*  0.16*  0.06  0.04  0.05  0.06 -0.00 -0.10* -0.02 -0.02  0.11*  0.05 
Note: n = 330, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
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Table A2: Correlation Matrix: Reputation-Sample 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Reputation             
2. 
International mobility          
(≥1 month, 1=yes) 
 0.07             
3. 
International mobility           
(≥4 months, 1=yes) 
 0.16*  0.75*           
4. 
International mobility         
(≥6 months, 1=yes) 
 0.19*  0.66*  0.89*          
5. 
International mobility          
(≥1  year, 1=yes) 
 0.18*  0.56*  0.75*  0.85*         
6. National mobility -0.10  0.03 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11        
7. 
Publication productivity 
(publication points per year) 
 0.12*  0.07  0.10  0.06  0.13* -0.09       
8. Male (1=yes)  0.05  0.08  0.05  0.05  0.07  0.02  0.12*      
9. Children (1=yes) -0.04 -0.05  0.04  0.04  0.00  0.01  0.02 -0.07     
10. Business (1=yes) -0.09 -0.21* -0.13* -0.12* -0.15* -0.09 -0.06 -0.19* -0.01    
11. Year of birth  0.13*  0.12*  0.06  0.02  0.02  0.17*  0.03 -0.13* -0.17*  0.10   
12. Reputation doctorate  0.09  0.01  0.00 -0.02 -0.04  0.05 -0.01  0.16* -0.10 -0.04 -0.07  
13. Mentoring (1=yes) -0.03  0.13*  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01  0.08 
Note: n = 219, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
